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Essentialist Blindness Would Not Preclude
Counterfactual Knowledge
Sònia Roca-Royes
University of Stirling (Scotland, UK)
Résumé : L’objectif de cet article est double. Il défend d’abord, contre une
menace potentielle, la thèse selon laquelle une capacité pour la connaissance es-
sentialiste ne doit pas figurer parmi les capacités fondamentales pour la connais-
sance des contrefactuels. Il évalue ensuite une conséquence de cette thèse, ou du
moins de la défense que j’en fais qui s’appuie sur une discussion des théories de
Kment et de Williamson portant sur le lien entre la modalité et les contrefactuels.
Abstract: This paper does two things. First, it defends, against a potential threat
to it, the claim that a capacity for essentialist knowledge should not be placed
among the core capacities for counterfactual knowledge. Second, it assesses
a consequence of that claim—or better: of the discussion by means of which I
defend it—in relation to Kment’s and Williamson’s views on the relation between
modality and counterfactuals.
1 Introduction and aims
Understood as what it is—an existential claim—it is safe to assume that we have
counterfactual knowledge. This claim would be true even if we only knew a
few trivial counterfactuals like: If I were there, I would be there. It is also un-
controversial that we have non-trivial counterfactual knowledge. I know that if
I were a seven-year-old human, I would have blood. Although I haven’t flipped
the £ 1 coin in my pocket, I know that if I had flipped it, it would most likely
end up in tails or heads. I know that if I ate an Amanita phalloides, I would
be severely poisoned. I know also that, in the scenario Williamson describes
in [Williamson 2007, 142], if the bush hadn’t been there, the rock would have
ended in the lake. When I say that it is uncontroversial that we know those
counterfactuals, I intend to be understood as saying that, mostly, it’s those who
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are sceptic about counterfactual knowledge in general that would find their
knowability controversial.
But there are counterfactuals whose knowledge (or knowability) is con-
troversial even among the non-sceptics. I distinguish two sorts. First, there
are counterfactuals the controversy around whose knowledge (or knowability)
is inherited from local controversies elsewhere. Do we know the content of
Goldbach’s Conjecture? Controversy here will translate into controversy as to
whether we know the counterfactual: “If Humphrey had won the elections, ev-
ery even integer greater than two could be expressed as the sum of two primes”.
Do we know whether humans are essentially so? Controversy here will translate
into controversy as to whether we know the counterfactual: “If Wittgenstein and
Betty Hutton had had a child in common, s/he would be essentially human”. 1
Second, there are counterpossibles. The controversy around the knowledge (or
knowability) of counterpossibles is the (socio-epistemological) consequence of
a philosophical disagreement among epistemic peers. If Nicotine—the yucca
plant in my office—were human, she would not have blood. Is this so? Here—
under the assumption that (it is agreed that) Nicotine cannot, metaphysically,
be a human being—the controversy is served. Those who—for whichever the-
oretical reasons—think that all counterpossibles are vacuously true would say
‘yes’ whereas those who allow—also for whichever theoretical reasons—for false
counterpossibles would most likely say ‘no, Nicotine would have blood if she
were human’.
I have two related goals in this paper. First, to motivate the negative answer
to the following question: Would our (hypothetical) blindness to the essentiality
of essential facts—‘essentialist blindness’ henceforth—preclude knowledge of all
or most counterfactuals (including most uncontroversial ones)? 2 The second
aim is to assess a certain consequence of such negative answer. I’ll achieve my
first aim by defending (i) over (¬i):
(i) Our epistemology of counterfactuals should not place the capacity for es-
sentialist knowledge among the core capacities for counterfactual knowl-
edge.
(¬i) Our epistemology of counterfactuals should place the capacity for essential-
ist knowledge among the core capacities for counterfactual knowledge.
I won’t offer a precise characterisation of the distinction between core capacities
for counterfactual knowledge and counterfactual-specific capacities. Instead, a
vague characterisation should suffice. A capacity for mathematical knowledge is
deployed in acquiring (first hand) knowledge of: “If two men and two women
1. The existence of this sort of controversial counterfactuals is one consequence of the
fact that, as Williamson says: “In general, our capacity to evaluate counterfactuals recruits
all our cognitive capacities to evaluate sentences” [Williamson 2007, 152].
2. By ‘uncontroversial counterfactual’ I mean counterfactual whose knowability is un-
controversial.
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had come to the party, four people would have come.” If that capacity is de-
ployed in acquiring knowledge of most counterfactuals—including most uncon-
troversial ones—it is a core capacity. If, for most counterfactuals, that capacity
is not deployed in acquiring knowledge of them, it is instead a counterfactual-
specific capacity. Similarly for any capacity that is deployed in acquiring knowl-
edge of (at least) some counterfactual. These hints as to how to understand the
distinction don’t provide a clear cut-off line. For current purposes, it won’t harm
to leave things underdetermined.
It is none of my current aims to argue that there are core capacities for coun-
terfactual knowledge. Instead, the paper is confined to doing the two things
anticipated above. First, to argue for (i)—independently of what’s the case with
other capacities—and, second, to assess a certain consequence of it.
Why, however, should one invest efforts in defending (i)? I intend this ques-
tion to have two dimensions. First, why is it important to secure (i)? Second,
who am I arguing against? I address them in turn.
The prospects of a satisfactory epistemology of essence are—we have reasons
to believe—worse than those of a satisfactory epistemology of counterfactuals.
The truth of (¬i), however, would make the epistemology of essence a consti-
tutive part of a general epistemology of counterfactuals. It is desirable to have
reasons against this dependence so that the possibility of progress in the episte-
mology of (the knowable) counterfactuals is justifiably believed to be immune
to our failures in the epistemology of essence. In a similar vein, that we have es-
sentialist knowledge is controversial. The truth of (¬i) would force us to transfer
this controversy onto most claims to counterfactual knowledge. It is desirable to
have reasons not to have to do this. In this context, it is of value to argue that
the robustness of our claim to counterfactual knowledge is independent of the
robustness (or else weakness) of our claim to essentialist knowledge.
But can’t we just take (i) for granted? This brings me to the second dimen-
sion of the question. I think that (i) is exceedingly plausible and that one should
be allowed to take it as the default claim. Provided—and here comes an im-
portant qualification—that there are no threats to it. As it turns out, there are
threats to it that one would do well, I think, not to overlook. These threats come
in the form of a suspicion that (¬i) might be true and which arises from the
works of Kment [Kment 2006] and Williamson [Williamson 2007]. To prevent
misunderstanding, let me emphasize that I attribute (¬i) neither to Kment nor
to Williamson. The claim is rather that their works provide grounds for thinking
that (¬i) might be true. I want to undermine those grounds.
Even granting that Kment and Williamson do not (explicitly at least) endorse
(¬i), would their views be somehow affected in the event that my post-threat
vindication of (i) were persuasive? It is assessment of the consequences of (i) as
far as this question is concerned that is my second goal. To anticipate: the rea-
sons I shall offer to vindicate (i) will reveal what I believe to be argumentative
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gaps in each of their accounts on the relation between modality and counterfac-
tuals.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In § 2, I construct the threat to
(i) that emerges from the works of Kment and Williamson. In § 3, I argue that
the case does not survive scrutiny and vindicate (i). In § 4, I articulate the
argumentative gaps in Kment’s and Williamson’s accounts that the discussion in
§ 3 appears to reveal.
In what follows, I make heuristic use of worlds and scenarios (whether pos-
sible or impossible). I also assume that we have (at least) uncontroversial non-
trivial counterfactual knowledge.
2 The two-horn case against (i)
In this section, I present the two-horn (prima facie) case for (¬i). The structure
of the case is as follows. Assuming that there are false counterpossibles—the
first horn—I formulate (emr-1); a general rule for counterfactual reasoning that
would be very reliable on this horn’s assumption. Assuming that all counter-
possibles are vacuously true—the second horn—I formulate (emr-2); a general
rule for counterfactual reasoning that would be very reliable on this horn’s as-
sumption. Kment endorses the content of the first assumption and Williamson
that of the second. Partly on the basis of their views, both (emr-1) and (emr-
2) could easily be thought to require, if we are to follow them in an informed
manner, (the proper exercise of) a capacity for essentialist knowledge in evaluat-
ing most counterfactuals. Either there are false counterpossibles or there aren’t.
The two-horn (prima facie) case that emerges from here is that, whether or
not there are false counterpossibles, a capacity for essentialist knowledge would
be a core capacity.
I begin with some preliminary remarks on the relation between counterfac-
tual truth and counterfactual knowledge.
According to (the thinnest expression of) the minimality requirement at the
level of truth-conditions, the worlds that are relevant to the truth or falsity of
(P  Q) are the closest P -worlds. 3 Disagreements arise, however, as to what
exactly the extension of the closeness relation is; that is, on which differences
among worlds contribute more to overall similarity than which others. It is
widely agreed that, given two worlds, w and w′, a draw in the number of same
facts that w and w′ share with the actual world need not mean a draw in their
overall similarity. Instead, which are the same facts can make a difference. And
once one is in the business of weighting similarities, the options are several as to
which (kinds of) facts are (thought to be) heavier than which others. I shall not
3. I assume, for simplicity and pace some doubts to the contrary expressed by Lewis
[Lewis 1973, § 1.4], that there always are closest worlds.
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commit myself to any detailed weighting system. I will only assume that (kinds
of) worlds are ordered as follows: 4
Nomically&metaphysically possible worlds sphere
Metaphysically possible worlds sphere
Nomically&¬metaphysically possible worlds shell
¬Nomically&¬metaphysically  possible worlds shell
Conceptually possible worlds sphere
Conceptually impossible worlds shell
Graphic 1
My assuming Graphic 1 does not beg the question against those who (would)
believe in fewer kinds of worlds than represented here. One just needs to delete
as many circles as necessary until one is left with a representation that mentions
only those kinds of worlds one believes in. Someone like Lewis would only
keep the two smallest circles, whereas someone like Nolan would arguably keep
them all. The assumption does not rule out conflation of circles either. All the
assumption rules out is this: the order-inversion of any two rings that represent
worlds one would believe in. So understood, this is not an uncommon thing to
assume and, at any rate, it is something Kment endorses 5 [Kment 2006, 258–
259] and Williamson gives us no reason to think he denies.
Now, the minimality requirement at the level of truth-conditions involves a
consistency bit and a maximal similarity bit. It amounts to the claim that the
closest worlds are those consistent worlds (provided the antecedent is consis-
tent) that are as similar to the actual world as the truth of the antecedent of
4. As the graphic suggests, a (non-empty) class of metaphysically impossible worlds
that nonetheless satisfy all the actual laws of nature should be recognized. A world where
Stuart Mill is a satisfied pig but that is qualitatively exactly like the actual world belongs
to this category. I am calling these worlds ‘metaphysically impossible yet nomically pos-
sible’. Kment—who takes the nomically possible worlds to be “just those metaphysically
possible worlds that have the same laws of nature as the actual world’‘ [2006, 261; my
emphasis]—would need to call them something else. But he presumably would not ne-
glect the existence of such (non-empty) category. To that extent, the disagreement here is
merely terminological.
5. Though not fully explicitly, since—terminological discrepancies aside (see previous
footnote)—he does not explicitly distinguish between the two shells within the shell of the
metaphysically impossible (but conceptually possible) worlds.
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the counterfactual at hand allows. What the counterfactual facts are depends on
what the similarity order is. And how capable we are of counterfactual knowl-
edge depends on how capable we are of tracking the similarity order. The exis-
tence of non-trivial counterfactual knowledge implies that, in hypothetical rea-
soning, and to some extent, we operate constrained by an epistemic counterpart
of the minimality requirement which, in evaluating (P  Q), sufficiently re-
liably leads us to consider what in fact are the closest P -worlds. In agreement
with Kment, “hypothetical reasoning needs to be based on rules that permit us
to determine which propositions are cotenable with a given antecedent” [Kment
2006, 288].
Which, then, are these rules? First, how they should not look like. A rule that
simply asked “consider consistent P -scenarios” would be a very unreliable guide
to counterfactual knowledge. For, for most true counterfactuals, (P  Q),
there are different ways of preserving consistency some of which do not satisfy
the minimal alteration bit and falsify Q. The Amanita phalloides counterfactual
illustrates this, and other examples are not difficult to come by. And a rule that
didn’t go beyond “consider consistent P -scenariosmaximally similar to the actual
world” would not be operationally effective unless it came with an indication as
to what counts as a maximally similar world (i.e., as to what counts as a minimal
change). How, then, would a reliable and operationally effective rule look like?
There are two most natural answers to this question, depending on whether or
not one believes that there are false counterpossibles. And, as anticipated, each
of them allows for the construction of a case against (i), which is what generates
the two-horn case against it. Let me consider them in turn.
Assume first that some counterpossibles are false—and that there are impos-
sible worlds. Counterpossible (1) is a plausible candidate to be false under these
assumptions:
(1) If Nicotine were human [P ], she would not have blood [Q].
Arguably, there are impossible worlds that are nonetheless logically consistent.
Among them, some are P&¬Q-worlds and some are P&Q-worlds. It is safe to
assume that all P&Q-worlds are further away from actuality than some P&¬Q-
world, which renders (1) false. Initial Reason: Since we are to preserve con-
sistency, Nicotine being human (i.e., P ) makes “Nicotine is not human” non-
cotenable. The law-like fact that all humans have blood, however, remains
cotenable. So it must stay—by the minimality bit. So human-Nicotine has blood
and (1) is false. Complaint: In fact, therefore, Nicotine being human makes non-
cotenable “Nicotine is not human” and “Nicotine has no blood”. That’s two items.
Why should these two items go away as opposed to these other two: “Nicotine
is not human” and “All humans have blood”? The assumption that worlds are
ordered as in Graphic 1, together with some further views of Kment, provides an
answer to this complainer.
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By looking at that graphic, we can see that, at the level of truth-conditions,
and other things being equal, 6 sameness of conceptual truths is the heaviest—
i.e., any world that violates as few as one of them is automatically placed at the
furthest shell—followed by sameness of metaphysical necessities, followed by
sameness of laws of nature, and followed by sameness of non-mathematical par-
ticular facts. 7 The metaphysical necessities, according to Kment, are whatever
is implied by the conceptual truths, the mathematical truths and the condition-
alized essential truths. A conditionalized essential truth about x is an essential
truth about x conditionalized on x’s existence. For instance, if water exists, it is
composed of H2O. 8 (The reason why Kment speaks of conditionalized essential
truths is to allow for essential yet contingent truths—e.g. water is composed of
H2O—whose contingency would be inherited from the contingency of the enti-
ties they are about—e.g. water.) Now, the two options that the complainer puts
on the table are different as to whether to delete “Nicotine has no blood” or “All
humans have blood”. Assuming that the latter is a biological necessity, it is the
former that should go, since it is a (non-mathematical) particular fact. 9 This is
the rejoinder that we can construct assuming Graphic 1 and the other views of
Kment involved.
On these assumptions, the following epistemic minimality requirement—
which closely mimics (a thicker expression of) the minimality requirement at
the level of truth-conditions—is, among the reliable and operationally effective
guides to counterfactual knowledge, ideally informative:
(emr-1) When evaluating (P  Q), imagine away as few truths as possible
compatibly with complying with:
(a) Preserve consistency; 10 and
(b) Imagine away p1 over p2 whenever:
(b.1) p1 is a non-mathematical particular fact and p2 is a nomic
or a mathematical or a conditionalized-essential or a con-
ceptual fact.
6. In Kment’s case: “other explanatory facts being equal”.
7. I include the qualification ‘non-mathematical’ here partly to follow Kment as closely
as possible (see (RM ) below in the main text). But also for independently good reasons:
While some mathematical facts are particular, they are (agreed to be) necessary and, as
such, heavier than particular facts about contingent entities. What to do with particular
facts about other abstract entities (like, perhaps, fictional characters) arguably depends
on whether these entities are contingent or necessary. For the sake of attempting to start
making progress at all with the current discussion, I leave this debate at one side. I believe
that the arguments can be adapted if other qualifications are believed to be necessary.
8. N.B.: An essential truth—e.g., (allegedly) water is composed of H2O—should not be
confused with an essentialist truth—e.g. water is essentially composed of H2O.
9. Despite being arguably essential, it is a non-mathematical particular fact and, there-
fore, it is less heavy than a natural law.
10. Doable only when P is not logically contradictory itself.
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(b.2) p1 is a nomic fact and p2 is a mathematical or a
conditionalized-essential or a conceptual fact.
(b.3) p1 is a mathematical or a conditionalized-essential fact and
p2 is a conceptual fact. 11
If p1 and p2 are of the same kind, it won’t make a difference to overall
similarity which one you imagine away.
Kment—who believes in false counterpossibles—comes very close to endors-
ing (emr-1) explicitly. As mentioned above, he thinks that hypothetical reason-
ing needs to be based on rules that permit us to determine which propositions
are cotenable with a given antecedent. He adds to this that “(RM ) is such a rule”
[Kment 2006, 288]. Consistency permitting, (RM ) requires us to hold fixed all
mathematical and conditionalized essential truths:
(RM ) Analytically consistent worlds in which all actual mathematical and
conditionalized essential truths hold are closer to the actual world
than all other worlds. [Kment 2006, 269]
Similarly, (RN )—consistency permitting—requires us to hold fixed all nomic
facts as well:
(RN ) Analytically consistent worlds in which all actual mathematical and
conditionalized essential truths hold, and which have the same laws
of nature as the actual world, are closer to the actual world than all
other worlds. [Kment 2006, 269]
And an analogous rule, (RC)—though Kment does not formulate it explicitly—
would require us to hold fixed all conceptual truths too:
(RC) Analytically consistent worlds are closer to the actual world than all
other worlds.
The difference between (emr-1) and (RN) + (RM) + (RC)—when taken as
rules that govern hypothetical reasoning—virtually reduces to a difference in
form. Let us grant for now that our counterfactual reasoning is based on a rule
akin to this.
How does it bear on (¬i)? Kment thinks, first, that “applications of (RM)
in hypothetical reasoning are very common” [Kment 2006, 289, my emphasis]
and, second, that, when one wants to apply (RM) when evaluating (P  Q),
one needs to proceed in two steps: (1) to determine whether P is metaphys-
ically possible and, if it is, (2) to determine which propositions are the meta-
physically necessary truths in order to (knowledgably) hold them all fixed.
He concludes that:
11. This clause must (and can) be included only if mathematical and essential truths are
believed not to be conceptual truths.
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Determining whether a given antecedent [is metaphysically possi-
ble] is thus a routine task that speakers face when applying (RM).
[. . . ]
Determining whether a proposition [is metaphysically necessary] is
therefore a routine task in evaluating counterfactuals. [Kment 2006,
289, my emphasis]
One might wonder why Kment thinks that determining whether something is
metaphysically possible [or necessary] is a step in our applications of (RM );
for the former involves the properties of metaphysical necessity and possibil-
ity while (RM) mentions mathematical and conditionalized-essential truths in-
stead. Given what he takes the necessary truths to be, the short answer is that de-
termining whether an analytically consistent proposition is metaphysically nec-
essary just is determining whether it is implied by the mathematical and the con-
ditionalized essential truths; and determining whether an analytically consistent
proposition is metaphysically possible just is determining whether it is compat-
ible with the mathematical and the conditionalized essential truths plus their
corresponding minor premises. (See [Kment 2006, 288–289] for the details.)
Equally routinely, therefore, we would need to deploy a capacity for essentialist
knowledge in counterfactual reasoning.
Now, I’m not in a position to say that ‘routinely’, in the context of Kment’s
views, implies ‘often enough as to imply (¬i)’, and this is why I don’t attribute
(¬i) to him. Yet, his ‘routine’-claim certainly provides enough grounds for a
prima facie case against (i) that no one who believes in false counterpossibles
and grants Graphic 1 should overlook. In § 3, I will provide the reasons on which
I believe this case can be undermined. Before that, I turn next to the second
horn; the one that, relying on Williamson’s work, can be constructed under the
assumption that all counterpossibles are vacuously true.
(emr-1) encodes a cotenability priority order that only those committed to
false counterpossibles—and to impossible worlds if to worlds at all—could be
happy with. Let me explain why this is so, and then identify an alternative
cotenability priority order that someone who believes that all counterpossibles
are vacuously true could be happy with. Consider (1) again:
(1) If Nicotine were human [P ], she would not have blood [Q].
And consider a semantics for counterfactuals with only metaphysically possible
worlds. Graphic 2 in the next page illustrates this case.
According to one such semantics, (1) is vacuously true: there is no (possible)
world where Nicotine is human (and has blood). Yet, if, in hypothetical reason-
ing, we followed (emr-1), we would judge (1) to be false. On the basis of clause
(a), we would preserve consistency; and, on the basis of (b.1), we would imag-
ine away: “Nicotine does not have blood” (p1) in favour of keeping “all humans
have blood” (p2). On one such semantics, therefore, (emr-1) is a highly unreli-
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¬P -sphere
@
Nomically possible worlds
Metaphysically possible worlds
Graphic 2
able guide to counterpossible knowledge. 12 If, by contrast: “Nicotine is human”
(the antecedent of (1)) and “Nicotine is a plant (and therefore not human)”—
which, let us assume, is an actual and essential truth—were both deemed coten-
able, their being jointly inconsistent could provide (access to) the vacuous truth
of (1); her not having blood would trivially follow.
Let me generalize. Every counterpossible—by definition, a counterfac-
tual with metaphysically impossible antecedent—contradicts some (non-
conditionalized) essential fact. On this basis, the easiest way to secure our sen-
sitivity to the vacuous truth of counterpossibles would be by means of a rule
that, in hypothetical reasoning, requires us to always hold essential facts fixed
(conditionalized or not) irrespective of the antecedent. Not surprisingly, this
is what Williamson—who thinks that all counterpossibles are vacuously true—
thinks about the way we reason counterfactually:
part of the general way we develop counterfactual suppositions is
to hold such constitutive [i.e., essential] facts fixed. [Williamson
2007, 164]
It is on these grounds that he thinks that we are sensitive to, for instance, the
vacuous truth of (2):
(2) ¬(Gold has atomic number 79)⊥.
If all counterpossibles are vacuously true, therefore, (emr-2) is, among the
reliable—on the current horn’s assumption—and operationally effective rules,
ideally informative:
(emr-2) When evaluating (P  Q), imagine away as few truths as possible
compatibly with complying with:
12. Sometimes—as in: “If Nicotine were human, she would have blood”—the judgement
could be judged to be correct (if we charitably ignore what are perhaps relevant differences
between judging x to be true and judging it to be vacuously true) but the rule is still highly
unreliable. I don’t need to enter this debate here.
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(c) Preserve consistency; 13 so long as doing so does not require you
to imagine away any essential fact (conditionalized or not, and
particular or not) and
(d) If all the essential facts are consistent with P , then, imagine
away p1 over p2 whenever:
(d.1) p1 is a (non-essential) particular fact and p2 is a nomic or a
mathematical or an essential or a conceptual fact. 14
(d.2) p1 is a nomic fact and p2 is a mathematical or an essential
or a conceptual fact.
(d.3) p1 is a mathematical fact and p2 is a conceptual fact. 15
If p1 and p2 are of the same kind, it won’t make a difference to overall
similarity which one you imagine away.
(When the antecedent of (P  Q) is metaphysically impossible, therefore, all
actual truths are cotenable.)
How does this bear on (¬i)? As an advocate of the vacuous truth of all
counterpossibles, Williamson endorses the following equivalences:
(◻) ◻A ≡ ¬A⊥
(◊) ◊A ≡ ¬(A⊥)
(emr-2) constrains what we can imagine away or must hold fixed in hypothetical
reasoning. Suppose that (¬A⊥) is true; so ¬A is metaphysically impossible
and the counterfactual, therefore, a counterpossible. For the sake of specificity
(and without loss of generality), suppose that it is (2) above.
Suppose—as Williamson thinks—that we have the capacity to know that (2)
is vacuously true. This implies that, in evaluating (2), we would hold fixed “Gold
has atomic number 79” despite the fact that it contradicts the antecedent of (2).
Looking back at (emr-2), and especially at clause (c), the suggested explanation
of why, in acquiring knowledge of (2), we hold that fixed is that we are sensitive
to the essentiality of “Gold has atomic number 79”. Generalizing, the suggested
explanation is that we have the capacity to know about the truth of vacuously
true counterpossibles and to know that the negations of their antecedents are
metaphysically necessary because we have a capacity for essentialist knowledge.
13. Doable only when P is not logically contradictory itself.
14. If mathematical or conceptual facts are essential—as one might plausibly endorse—
there is redundancy in (d.1) and (d.2). But redundancy won’t do any harm here (and
the intensional differences might be serviceable, as § 3 will put us in a position to see). In
addition, for the reasons in footnote 7, if mathematical facts were believed to be necessary
yet not essential, (d.1) should begin with ‘p1 is a non-essential and non-mathematical,
particular fact’.
15. This clause must (and can) be included only if mathematical facts are believed not
to be essential.
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Indeed, according to Williamson, the judgement that something is metaphysi-
cally necessary is the output of evaluating counterpossibles together with the
fact that holding fixed essential facts “is part of our general way of assessing
counterfactuals” [Williamson 2007, 170]. (Note an additional disagreement be-
tween Kment and Williamson: only according to Williamson are all particular
essential facts necessary; in line with his necessitist views.)
Now, even if the suggested explanation were correct, it being so falls ad-
mittedly short of supporting (¬i). All it supports is that the knowability of at
least some counterfactuals depends on our essentialist vision. But (¬i) requires it
to be so for at least most counterfactuals. How, then, could Williamson’s work
provide grounds for thinking that (¬i) might be true? Not only does Williamson
think that (some) counterpossibles, like (2), are accessible to us but also that, in
evaluating counterfactuals of the form of (2), our reasoning is:
subject to the same constraints, whatever they are, as counterfac-
tual conditionals in general, concerning which parts of our back-
ground information are held fixed. [Williamson 2007, 163–164]
No matter whether the counterfactual at hand is a counterpossible or not,
or of the form of (2) or not, therefore, one same rule—encoding the rele-
vant cotenability priority order—governs our hypothetical reasoning in general.
Williamson is particularly explicit about this in [Williamson 2007, 171]. There,
he considers the objection that a capacity to know ordinary counterfactuals—
typically not counterpossibles and typically with consistent consequent—need
not amount to a capacity to know counterfactuals of the form (A⊥). The
response he offers is to the effect that it does amount to it. For the reasons
above, if we are sensitive—as we are according to Williamson—to the vacuous
truth of counterpossibles like (2)—which is of the form (A⊥)—those general
constraints must be akin to (emr-2). Since one same rule governs hypotheti-
cal reasoning, then, independently of whether the counterfactual at hand is a
counterpossible or not, or has consistent consequent or not, (emr-2), or a rule
equivalent to it, is the rule that constrains our hypothetical reasoning also when
we evaluate ordinary counterfactuals.
When applying (emr-2) in counterfactual reasoning, we have to proceed in
two steps: (1) determine whether the negation of the antecedent is (or is meta-
physically implied by) an essential fact, (2) only if it is, hold it fixed. Paralleling
Kment’s reasoning above, therefore, the belief that this might induce is that we
routinely deploy our capacity for essentialist knowledge in evaluating counter-
factuals (whether ordinary or not); contra (i). This is a prima facie case against
(i) that no one who believes in the vacuous truth of all counterpossibles should
overlook. Also in this case, I want to resist it in § 3.
This concludes my prima facie two-horn case against (i).
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3 Reinstating (i)
In this section, and granting that either (emr-1) or (emr-2) encode the correct
cotenability priority order (i.e., granting Graphic 1), I argue that (i) should be
reinstated. The conclusion I’m after is correspondingly two-horn: whether or not
one believes in false counterpossibles, (i) is in good standing. I’ll achieve this
conclusion by arguing that:
(ii) (Granted Graphic 1) Essentialist blindness would preclude the knowa-
bility of some counterfactuals but not most—for a substantial body of
counterfactuals, it would not preclude their knowability.
(i) follows from (ii). For (i) says that a capacity for essentialist knowledge is
not a core capacity for counterfactual knowledge and (ii) says that too and, in
addition, that our essentialist vision—if we have it—is a counterfactual-specific
capacity. Arguing for (ii), therefore, will be my vindication-strategy. The extra
content of (ii) will be used in § 4.
The argument to follow is somehow complex, because I aim at an argument
that can be found persuasive irrespective of one’s views on the truth-value of
counterpossibles. (emr-1) and (emr-2) are statements of the two ideally in-
formative rules for counterfactual reasoning that, respectively, a believer and
a disbeliever in false counterpossibles can reasonably endorse. The reason for
this is that (emr-1) would make us track the sometimes truth and sometimes
falsity—under the first horn’s assumption—of counterpossibles, and (emr-2)
would make us track their always being vacuously true—under the second horn’s
assumption. For the reasons in § 2, I grant that, in order to acquire knowledge of
a given counterfactual, the evaluator has to behave according to (emr-1) [or else
(emr-2)] in an informed manner. The main idea in the argument below is that,
even if we suffered from essentialist blindness, we could still informedly behave
according to (emr-1) [or else (emr-2)] when evaluating many counterfactuals;
enough of them as to undermine (¬i).
There are two sources of essentialist blindness—the phenomenon of being
blind to the essentiality of essential facts—relevant for current purposes:
(Con) Due to conceptual impoverishment; suffered by those who lack essen-
tialist notions, thereby being not even enabled to grasp essentialist
thoughts—let alone to acquire essentialist knowledge.
(Cog) Due to cognitive impoverishment (broadly understood); suffered by
those who, while conceptually equipped to grasp a true essential-
ist thought (like ⌜a essentially φ′s⌝) are nonetheless not cognitively
equipped to know that it is true. 16
16. Equivalently: suffered by those who, while conceptually equipped to entertain es-
sentialist thoughts, are not cognitively equipped to know, of an essential truth—like (al-
legedly) water is composed of H2O—that it is an essential truth.
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Given these two potential sources, and given what kind of argument I aim at,
this is its structure:
Essentialist blindness
No false counterpossibles
False counterpossibles
(Con)
(Cog)
(ii)
(ii)
(Con) (ii)
(Cog) (ii)
((emr-2) horn)
((emr-1) horn)
3.1 The case for those who believe that all counterpos-
sibles are true; the (emr-2) horn
Suppose that all counterpossibles are vacuously true. Suppose also—borrowing
one of Williamson’s everyday examples—that in our world a rock falls down
a slope and, instead of ending in the lake at the bottom, it rolls into a bush.
Suppose further that (3) is true:
(3) If the bush had not been there [P ], the rock would have ended in the
lake [Q].
The (emr-2)+(Con) case. Could, in evaluating (3), a (Con)-evaluator behave
according to (emr-2) in a knowledge-conferring manner? I think she could (as-
suming minimal logical skills). One lacking essentialist notions is compatible
with one being guided (in hypothetical reasoning) by the non-crossed-out por-
tion of (emr-2): 17
(emr-2) When evaluating (P  Q), imagine away as few truths as possible
compatibly with complying with:
(c) Preserve consistency so long as doing so does not require you
to imagine away any essential fact (conditionalized or not, and
particular or not); and
(d) If all the essential facts are consistent with P , then, imagine
away p1 over p2 whenever:
(d.1) p1 is a non-essential particular fact and p2 is a nomic or a
mathematical or an essential or a conceptual fact.
(d.2) p1 is a nomic fact and p2 is a mathematical or an essential
or a conceptual fact.
17. In relation to fottnote 14, this is why the intensional differences might be useful
despite a potential redundancy.
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(d.3) p1 is a mathematical fact and p2 is a conceptual fact.
If p1 and p2 are of the same kind, it won’t make a difference to overall
similarity which one you imagine away.
P is the negation of the—by assumption—actual truth ‘the bush is there’ (¬P ).
Can the conceptually-impoverished evaluator imagine ‘¬P ’ away? Yes, because
“¬P ” contradicts the antecedent and—we theorists know—it is not an essential
fact. But would she imagine it away? Yes, because “¬P ” contradicts the an-
tecedent and, despite her lacking essentialist notions, she is following a portion
of (c) that asks her to do so. Next: Where would the rock end? If she knew that
“the rock ends there” is a particular fact, and if she knew also that “rocks slide
down sufficiently steep slopes like this unless there’s something on their way to
stop them” is a nomic fact, she would (be in a position to) knowledgeably follow
(d.1), thereby imagining away “the rock ends there” and imagining in “the rock
ends in the lake”. This blind evaluator would therefore act according to (emr-2)
despite her (Con)-blindness.
I conditionalized twice with ‘If she knew’; once, on her knowing that cer-
tain facts are particular facts; the other, on her knowing about nomic tenden-
cies. Those antecedents might not be true on occasions. For my argument to
go through, however, I don’t need the antecedents to be true. If the conditionals
are true—as I intend them to be so-recognized—then, as far as evaluating (3)
is concerned, informedly acting according to the seen portion of (emr-2) does not
require essentialist notions. In addition, the evaluator’s behaviour amounts to
acting according to (emr-2).
Similar conclusions apply in the cases of other uncontroversial
counterfactuals—typically not counterpossibles and with consistent conse-
quent. I omit the statement of analogous treatments but one might want to
explore other cases like, for instance:
(4) If I were there, I would be there.
(5) If I were a seven-year-old human, I would have blood.
(6) If I had flipped the coin, it would most likely end up in tails or heads.
(7) If I ate an Amanita Phalloides I would be severely poisoned.
Consequently, the impoverished rule that the conceptually impoverished evalu-
ator follows is, for a big enough body of counterfactuals, a sufficiently reliable
guide to counterfactual truth. Provided that she responsibly acts according to the
portion of (emr-2) she has conceptual resources to see, the output of so doing
will be a true and informed judgement. If my belief that I have hands counts as
knowledge, those counterfactual judgments should count as knowledge too.
So far, of (ii), I’ve motivated this much (for the (emr-2)+(Con) case): for a
substantial body of counterfactuals, essentialist blindness would not preclude their
knowability. I will next argue that: it would nonetheless preclude the knowability
of some.
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Our conceptual impoverishment would block—in the current case—the
knowability of at least some counterpossibles as well as that of some non-
counterpossibles. Consider first counterpossible (2):
(2) ¬(Gold has atomic number 79) [¬P ] ⊥ [Q].
Could, in evaluating (2), a conceptually impoverished evaluator behave accord-
ing to (emr-2) in a knowledge-conferringmanner? I think this time she could not.
¬P is the negation of the—by assumption—actual and essential truth ‘Gold has
atomic number 79’. Can the conceptually-impoverished evaluator imagine ‘P ’
away? No, because it is an essential fact and, as per (c), it must stay. But would
a responsible such evaluator imagine it away? Yes, because it contradicts the
antecedent and, according to the bit of (c) she sees, it must be imagined away.
The conceptually-impoverished evaluator would therefore preserve consistency,
thereby judging (2) to be false. However, (2) is true—all counterpossibles are
true in the current case. The evaluator would therefore arrive at a false judge-
ment. 18 Similar conclusions apply in the case of many other counterpossibles. 19
If Kment’s treatment of (8) below is correct [Kment 2006, 289], there are
also counterfactuals that are not counterpossibles and that are also epistemically
inaccessible for a conceptually-impoverished evaluator:
(8) People use a certain colourless, odourless, tasteless liquid that is not
composed of hydrogen and oxygen to quench their thirst, etc. .
People use a liquid other than water.
Kment thinks that, in evaluating (8), we—as a matter of fact—behave as follows:
we imagine away the actual and non-essential truth that ‘water is the colourless,
odourless, tasteless liquid that people usually use to quench their thirst, brush
their teeth, etc.’ and we hold fixed instead the actual and essential—or so let us
grant—truth ‘if water exists, it is composed of hydrogen and oxygen’. (Note that
they are individually consistent yet jointly inconsistent with the antecedent, so
exactly one must go.) He then explains why we—as a matter of fact—behave as
we do by appealing to our essentialist vision; in particular, to our knowledge that
‘if water exists, it is composed of hydrogen and oxygen’ is an essential truth. The
knowability of this Putnam-style example would be precluded too if we suffered
from (Con)-blindness.
18. Any behaviour according to (c) under the illusion that one has to behave accord-
ing to the seen portion of (c) would be blame-worthy in the case of (2) and, as such,
knowledge-destroying.
19. Sometimes—as in “¬(Gold has atomic number 79) 2 + 2 = 4”—the judgement
that a counterpossible is true might be argued to amount to knowledge; provided one is
charitably not too picky about that judgment not (possibly) taking into account its being
vacuously true. Whether those judgements amount to knowledge is controversial, but I
don’t need to decide these cases here. If they do, they provide additional support for the
previous bit of (ii) I argued for. And to argue for the bit of (ii) I’m currently arguing for, it
suffices that sometimes—as in (2)—the judgement be uncontroversially incorrect.
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We can sum up as follows. Examples (2) and (8)—granting Kment’s diag-
nosis of the latter—show that, sometimes, the conceptually impoverished eval-
uator might have a dilemma as to whether or not to imagine a given fact away
that would critically require (the proper exercise of) her essentialist vision to
solve it in a knowledge-conferring manner. Example (3)—and, by extrapola-
tion, (4)-(7)—suggests, however, that many (ordinary) counterfactuals will not
generate such critical dilemmas. This concludes my argument for (ii) for the
(emr-2)+(Con) case.
The (emr-2)+(Cog) case. The (Cog)-type counterfactual evaluator sees—let
us assume, so that the case is interestingly different from the previous one—
the whole of (emr-2) but is cognitively impoverished. Now, knowledge that
X is not an essential fact is compatible with (Cog)-type essentialist blindness. 20
Therefore, there are non-counterpossibles such that, when evaluating them, one
can knowledgeably follow (c) compatibly with being blind to the essentiality of
essential facts. Let me elaborate on this by focusing on (3). A (Cog)-type evalu-
ator can know that the presence here of this bush is essential neither to the bush
nor to the place without knowing, of any essential fact, that it is an essential
fact. “The bush is there” would therefore be imagined away. Next: Where would
the rock end? If she knew that “the rock ends there” is a non-essential particular
fact, and if she knew that “rocks slide down sufficiently steep slopes like this
unless there’s something on their way to stop them” is a nomic fact, she would
(be in a position to) knowledgeably follow (d.1), thereby imagining away “the
rock ends there” and imagining in “the rock ends in the lake”. The counterfactual
would correctly be judged to be true. As above, I intend this example to be gen-
eralizable to a substantial body of non-counterpossibles, among which (4)-(7).
For reliability reasons as above, these informed true judgements should count as
knowledge.
Things are otherwise with (this time: all) counterpossibles. If “Gold has
atomic number 79” is an essential fact, one cannot know that it is not (by factic-
ity of knowledge). And a (Cog)-evaluator cannot know either that it is essential.
Under these circumstances, any behaviour according to (c)—the whole of which
is now seen—when evaluating (2) would be knowledge-undermining. The dis-
cussion of (8) above applies in the (Cog)-case too.
By now, therefore, we have enough reasons for (ii) also in the (emr-
2)+(Cog) case. Nonetheless, it will be helpful to discuss here (9) as well:
(9) If Wittgenstein and Betty Hutton had had a child [P ], s/he would be
essentially human [Q].
Compared to (2) and (8), its distinctive feature is that it overtly involves essen-
tialist notions. As a result, it would be ungraspable by a (Con)-evaluator but not
20. Knowledge that I’m not an essentially standing being (e.g., on the basis of my being
sitting or having sat) is compatible with blindness as to which the essential facts are.
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by a (Cog)-one. Even if graspable, it remains unknowable. If S knew that ‘¬P ’ is
a non-essential particular fact, she would act according to clause (c) and imag-
ine it away. Next: would the child be essentially human? The child is essentially
human in the closest P -worlds if and only if ‘All humans are essentially so’ is an
actual truth. The epistemic priority here lies on the right-hand side: unless S
knows whether ‘all humans are essentially so’ is actually true, she won’t know
whether the child is essentially human in the closest P -worlds.
This concludes the first half of the argument.
3.2 The case for those who believe that there are false
counterpossibles; the (emr-1) horn
Suppose that there are false counterpossibles. Consider (3) again:
(3) If the bush had not been there [P ], the rock would have ended in the
lake [Q].
The (emr-1)+(Con) case. Could, in evaluating (3), a conceptually-impoverished
evaluator behave according to (emr-1) in a knowledge-conferring manner? I
think she could. As above, conceptual impoverishment of the kind at issue is
compatible with one being nonetheless sensitive to the non-crossed-out portion
of (emr-1):
(emr-1) When evaluating (P  Q), imagine away as few truths as possible
compatibly with complying with:
(a) Preserve consistency; and
(b) Imagine away p1 over p2 whenever:
(b.1) p1 is a non-mathematical particular fact and p2 is a nomic
or a mathematical or a conditionalized-essential or a con-
ceptual fact.
(b.2) p1 is a nomic fact and p2 is a mathematical or a
conditionalized-essential or a conceptual fact.
(b.3) p1 is a mathematical or a conditionalized-essential fact and
p2 is a conceptual fact.
If p1 and p2 are of the same kind, it won’t make a difference to overall
similarity which one you imagine away.
Except for ‘non-mathematical’—which makes no significance difference—the re-
maining bit is identical to what remained in the case of (emr-2). Consequently,
the conceptually-impoverished yet responsible evaluator would behave exactly
as above: she would imagine away (¬P ) and “the rock ends there”. But should
she behave like that? Yes. (¬P ) should be imagined away according to clause (a)
and “the rock ends there” should be imagined away according to (b.1). Similar
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conclusions apply in the case of many other everyday counterfactuals like (4)-
(7). Also in this case, therefore, the output will be a true and informed judge-
ment that should count as knowledge.
This case differs from the previous (Con)-case in that, according to clause
(a)—but not according to clause (c)—the negation of a given antecedent should
be imagined away irrespective of whether it is an essential fact. As far as
counterpossibles are concerned, therefore, there are even fewer chances for the
conceptually-impoverished evaluator to deviate from the demands of (emr-1).
A current assumption is that there are false counterpossibles, and (2) is a best
candidate to be an instance of the (content of the) assumption. By the reasons
in the previous (Con)-case, it will be judged to be false by the conceptually-
impoverished evaluator, provided she is responsibly acting according to the part
of the rule she sees. So it will be known to be false.
In relation to (ii), therefore, and for the current (Con)-case, we have enough
material to conclude that, for a substantial body of counterfactuals (now including
some counterpossibles), essentialist blindness would not preclude their knowability.
To conclude my argument for (ii) for this case, I should next argue that it would
nonetheless block the knowability of some of them. To this effect, it suffices to note
that the reflections above on counterfactual (8)—granting Kment’s diagnosis—
apply here as well.
The (emr-1)+(Cog) case. This is the fourth and final case. Ordinary coun-
terfactuals like (3)-(7) will be knowable also by this (Cog)-evaluator that sees
the whole of (emr-1). This is even more straightforward in this case than in
the (emr-2)+(Cog) one, since (emr-1) leaves less space for what we referred to
above as critical dilemmas (i.e., dilemmas that require essentialist vision to solve
them knowledgeably). One can see this by comparing clauses (a) and (c). By
parity of reasoning, therefore, also in this case we get that for a substantial body
of counterfactuals (also including some counterpossibles now), essentialist blindness
would not preclude their knowability.
For reasons strictly analogous to those in the previous (Cog)-case, counter-
factuals along the lines of (8) and (9) are epistemically inaccessible to (Cog)-
evaluators also under the (emr-1)-assumption. Therefore, (Cog)-essentialist
blindness would block the knowability of some counterfactuals.
This concludes the second half of the argument.
If the argument in this section is persuasive, then, irrespective of whether
we are sympathetic to the cotenability priority order encoded in (emr-1) or to
the one encoded in (emr-2), we have no good reason to think that (i) is false.
This concludes my two-horn defence of it.
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4 Consequences for Kment’s and Williamson’s
views on the relation between modality and
counterfactuals
It emerges from §3 that no view on the truth-value of counterpossibles by itself
incurs commitment to (¬i). This is good news; especially if (i) is agreed to be the
default claim. The discussion there, however, puts us in a position to realize—or
so I wish to motivate next—that certain evolutionary explanations that Kment
and Williamson provide are unsatisfactory.
Kment and Williamson appeal to the evolutionary usefulness of counterfac-
tual knowledge with a view to achieving several explanatory goals. Among them
(see [Williamson 2007, 134–136] and [Kment 2006, 243, and 288–290]):
(EG.1) Explaining the emergence of our metaphysical modal notions and
thought (Kment and Williamson)
(EG.2) Explaining the existence of our capacity for metaphysical modal
knowledge (Kment and Williamson)
(EG.3) Subsuming the epistemology of metaphysical modality under the epis-
temology of counterfactuals (Williamson).
Consider now these similar goals one could have:
(EG.4) Explaining the emergence of our essentialist notions and thought
(EG.5) Explaining the existence of our capacity for essentialist knowledge
(EG.6) Subsuming the epistemology of essence under the epistemology of
counterfactuals.
And consider these two tasks:
(*) Meeting (EG.4)-(EG.6) without having (¬i) available
(**) Meeting (EG.4)-(EG.6) by appealing to (¬i)
In order to identify what I believe to be argumentative gaps in Williamson’s and
Kment’s ways of achieving (EG.1)-(EG.3), I’ll proceed as follows. First, I’ll show
that (**) is considerably easier than (*). Second, I’ll show how that bears on
(EG.1)-(EG.3) in the context of Kment’s and Williamsons’ accounts.
(**) is easier than (*). Knowledge of ordinary (and uncontroversial) coun-
terfactuals like (7): “If I ate an Amanita Phalloides I would be severely poisoned”
have a very good claim to be evolutionarily useful. If (¬i) were true, knowl-
edge of most ordinary counterfactuals like (7) would already require a capacity
for essentialist knowledge. Consequently, the fact that knowledge of them is
evolutionarily advantageous would suffice to, on those grounds, meet the goals
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(EG.4)-(EG.6) by means of an evolutionary explanation. But if (i) is true—and
thereby (¬i) unavailable—considerably more needs to be done to meet those
goals by those means. Let me elaborate.
As noticed in § 3, (ii) implies not only (i) but also that a capacity for essen-
tialist knowledge—if we have it—is a counterfactual-specific capacity. Suppose—
as engagement in (EG.4)-(EG.6) presupposes—that we enjoy essentialist vision.
Let C be the set of all counterfactuals that we are conceptually enabled to
know (and therefore have conceptual resources to entertain). The claim that
our capacity for essentialist knowledge is counterfactual-specific implies that
there is a non-empty proper subset of C—let’s call it ‘(DepEss)’—that is exactly
the set of counterfactuals from C whose knowability depends on us not being
blind to the essentiality of essential facts. Let us call the complementary subset
‘(NotDepEss)’. Consider now the following claim:
(iii) Our (hypothetical) essentialist blindness would have (had) no negative
effect on our survival or reproduction chances because epistemic ac-
cess to the elements in (DepEss) is evolutionarily irrelevant (or, at any
rate, redundant). Rather, it is epistemic access to (some of) the ele-
ments of (NotDepEss) that makes the evolutionary difference in view
(or, at any rate, that suffices for it).
In the absence of (¬i), and in order to meet (EG.4)-(EG.6) by means of an evo-
lutionary explanation, one must argue that (iii) is false. Now, belief on what
the elements of (DepEss) are depends on whether one believes in false counter-
possibles or not. As we saw in § 3, if one disbelieves in false counterpossibles,
(DepEss) should be believed to include virtually all non-trivial counterpossibles,
Putnam-style counterfactuals like (8)—granting Kment’s diagnosis—and coun-
terfactuals like (9). If one believes in false counterpossibles, those (false) coun-
terpossibles are arguably excluded from (DepEss). But in each case, (DepEss)
contains elements whose knowability is independently controversial—let alone
their evolutionary usefulness. Many ordinary counterfactuals like (7)—with pos-
sible antecedent—are plausibly known and plausibly evolutionarily useful. But
these counterfactuals fall, in all cases, under (NotDepEss). 21 To successfully
argue against (iii), one would need to argue that we (the species) know some el-
ements in (DepEss)— enough of them to ground evolutionary explanations—and
that knowledge of them is (or has been) evolutionarily useful. Given what—on
the basis of § 3—we can expect the elements of (DepEss) to be—on each of
the two (Cog)-horns—this is a very difficult task; certainly considerably harder
21. Let me say in passing: My explanation why the knowability of ordinary counterfac-
tuals like (3)-(7) is not controversial is two-fold. First, they are epistemically accessible
even when guided by some impoverished rule and, second, they are counterfactuals on
which (emr-1) and (emr-2) agree. They are, therefore, among the agreed data. To rest
one’s case on controversial counterfactuals is a more demanding task. (See [Roca-Royes
2011] for a related point.)
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than (**), especially given that everyday counterfactuals like (3)-(7) are not in
(DepEss).
How does this bear on (EG.1)-(EG.3)? Each of (EG.1)-(EG.3) speaks of
metaphysical modality. Here, I need to separate the case of metaphysical ne-
cessity from that of metaphysical possibility. I begin with the former. The
conditionalized-essential facts that (emr-1) mentions are metaphysically nec-
essary according to Kment, and so are, according to Williamson, the essential
facts that (emr-2) mentions. With this in mind, one can now retrospectively
check that, mutatis mutandis, and by their respective lights, the arguments in
§ 3 apply to the property of metaphysical necessity as well. As a result, by their
lights (especially: by what each takes the metaphysical necessities to be):
(iv) (Granted Graphic 1) Blindness to the metaphysical necessity of meta-
physically necessary factswould preclude the knowability of some coun-
terfactuals but not most—for a substantial body of counterfactuals, it
would not preclude their knowability.
To satisfactorily achieve (EG.1)-(EG.3) by means of an evolutionary explanation
for the case of metaphysical necessity, therefore, Kment and Williamson would
need to argue that we (the species) know some elements in (DepEss)—enough
of them to ground evolutionary explanations—and that knowledge of them is
(or has been) evolutionarily useful. That difficult task, however, as far as I’ve
been able to see, has been carried out by none of them. This reveals what I
believe to be a considerable argumentative gap in their respective accounts.
Provided that my arguments in relation to metaphysical necessity are per-
suasive, we now got to a dialectical point where I think that it wouldn’t add
much to unfold the case of metaphysical possibility. For—that proviso in place—
Kment’s and Williamson’s accounts, as they (seem to) stand, support, at most, a
counterfactual-based evolutionary explanation for the case of metaphysical pos-
sibility only. This, for some (and I believe Kment and Williamson to be included
here), would be a disappointingly less philosophically significant result.
Despite not needing to elaborate much on this: I think that similar con-
clusions as above apply in the case of metaphysical possibility all the same. I
shall just offer a hint as why I think so: none of the arguments in § 3 that were
aimed at showing that—whichever the case—ordinary counterfactuals like (3)-
(7) belong to (NotDepEss) exploited at any point the evaluator’s sensitivity to
the metaphysical possibility of metaphysically possible facts either.
On the basis of §§ 3–4, therefore, and as far as we’ve been given reasons to
believe, it might still be that essentialist and metaphysical modal thought can
be “removed from our conceptual scheme without collateral damage”, contrary
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to what Williamson argues [Williamson 2007, 136] and Kment suggests [Kment
2006, § 7]. 22 , 23
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